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Three Ways of Watching a Sports Video 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
It does not typically seem to be worthwhile re-watching a sport match, for example in a video 
recording, once the result is known.  Sports matches are like detective stories.  Once one knows 
'whodunit' there seems little point in revisiting the tale.  By drawing on an argument from 
musicologist Edward T. Cone, this paper argues that certain sports matches may be revisited with 
profit.  The initial experience of a game may be of a series of events that are often ambiguous or 
confusing as to their meaning or purpose.  The full appreciation of a sport match requires, not just 
this initial familiarity with the immediately perceived events of the game, but also an awareness of 
the tactics being deployed by both sides.  An understanding of tactics and strategy is akin to the 
analysis of a piece of music (or other art work).  A further (third) viewing of the game, during 
which one can appreciate how the tactics inform the events naively experienced in the first viewing, 
will yield, it will be argued, an aesthetic pleasure.  This takes the experience of sport beyond the 
merely entertaining or exciting.  In certain games, the third viewing may also transcend an 
appreciation of the merely formal qualities of the game, and so offer substantial insights into what it 
is to be human. 
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Introduction 
Sports matches are ephemeral events.  Once played and the result known, our interest typically 
passes on to the next match.  As such, the sports match resembles the detective story.  Once the 
reader knows 'whodunit' (or perhaps how it was done), there seem to be few reasons to revisit it.  
Here a detective story stands in apparent contrast to any novel that would aspire to the exalted status 
of art.  It may be taken for granted that art works can be profitably revisited.  A re-reading of Chad 
Harbach's Art of Fielding: A Novel (2011) will yield an appreciation that is deeper than the initial 
reading.  Returning to recordings of baseball games, of the sort described in the novel, would 
seemingly offer no such rewards.  This parallel might suggest that sport is little more than a 
relatively superficial entertainment, akin to the detective story, and as such cannot aspire to the 
cultural depth or importance of the art work. 
I intend to explore the possibility that under certain conditions sports matches may be worthy 
of a second (and third) viewing.  To understand these conditions is to understand the sort of cultural 
event a sports match is, and thus the potential importance of sport within a broader culture.  Further, 
if a game can be the sort of event that can be profitably re-visited, then this will say something 
about the nature of sport as an event that requires interpretation.  The second and third viewings of a 
game may be worthwhile precisely because they allow for new and richer interpretations.  
The paper will proceed by offering a critical rehearsal the arguments of musicologist Edward 
T. Cone (1989) as to why we might want both to re-read certain detective stories and listen 
repeatedly to a piece of music.  Cone offers an account of why art works are worth revisiting.  A 
modified version of Cone's analysis will then be applied to sport and games in order to untangle the 
reasons that we might have for watching a game repeatedly.  At the core of this argument lies Kant's  
distinction, in his discussion of the appreciation of beauty, between agreeableness and pleasure.  
Pleasure is a more profound experience, grounding in the mind as well as the sensual experiences of 
the body.  By drawing on this distinction, I will argue that sport is not simply agreeable or 
entertaining.  To watch a sports match a second time entails that it is a complex event worthy of an 
appreciation akin to that typically involved in the repeated engagement with art works.  Such 
appreciation will yield pleasure, not mere entertainment.  At its most straight-forward, it will be 
argued that this repeated watching is grounded in an analytic awareness of strategy and tactics.  Yet, 
potentially, revisiting a game takes this appreciation of it beyond the merely awareness of tactical 
subtleties towards an understanding of sport as an insight into the human condition.  If this 
suggestion is justified, then sports matches may aspire to a cultural significance akin to that enjoyed 
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by the arts. 
 
Re-reading a detective story. 
We read a detective story in order to find out what happens.  Once read, it should lose its appeal.  
As Cone observes, we may reread the tale 'not for story but for style, for portrayal of character, for 
comment on society' (1989, 77-8).  Such motivations may be put to one side for the moment.  The 
crucial point is that, as long as we remember the denouement of a detective story, there seems little 
point in returning to read it again as a story.  Yet Cone observes that he does return, with pleasure, 
to certain stories, and Conan Doyle's 'The Speckled Band' is a case in point.i   
The plot of 'The Speckled Band' may be briefly outlined (see Cone 1989 pp 78-9).  As 
narrator, Dr. Watson begins by promising to reveal the the truth about Dr Roylott's death.  He tells 
first of the visit of Roylott's step-daughter, Helen Stoner, to Sherlock Holmes, and of how Stoner 
recounts her family history.  Roylott had lived for sometime in Indian, gaining a reputation for his 
cruelty.  He married Stoner's widowed mother upon returning to England.  The mother died, and her 
will stipulated that Roylott will enjoy her estate until her two daughters marry, at which point the 
estate will be split between the daughters.  Two years previously, Stoner's sister had died under 
mysterious circumstances and shortly before her intended marriage.  Her dying words mentioned 'a 
speckled band', seemingly a reference to a band of gypsies travelling in the neighbourhood.  Now 
Helen Stoner is herself engaged to be married and certain recent events have made her fear for her 
life.  Holmes agrees to help her.  Shortly after her departure Roylott himself appears on the scene, 
threatening Holmes.  Undeterred, of course, Holmes and Watson travel to Roylott's home.  Hiding 
in Helen Stoner's room, in darkness, Watson sees Holmes attack something, seemingly in order to 
protect her.  Watson hears a cry from Roylott's room, and upon investigation finds him dead, with a 
'speckled band' about his head.  The speckled band is revealed to be a poisonous Indian snake that 
Roylott had introduced into Helen Stoner's room (just as he had to her sister's), but when struck by 
Holmes it had fled and attacked its master. 
Cone's claim is that the pleasure that lies in the reading, and indeed re-reading, of this story 
centres around one's identification with Watson's confusion as to what is really happening, but also 
in its exploitation of certain conventions of detective story-telling.  We readers are deliberately 
misled by reference to a gypsy band.  Similarly, Dr Roylott appears too obvious a villain to be the 
actually murderer.  The true mystery lies in how Roylott carries out the murder (and thus what the 
speckled band might be) and not in identifying Roylott as the murderer.  Doyle has concealed a 
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'howdunit' (a locked room mystery, in effect) within the appearance of a 'whodunit'. 
Cone therefore suggests that there is a profitable second reading of the story to be had as we 
reconstruct the true order and nature of events that lie behind Watson's narrative.  Watson's own 
account can be analysed, broken down into its component parts and reconstructed in a simple 
chronology: Roylott murders his elder step-daughter to safe-guard his inheritance, doing so with a 
poisonous snake, and now threatens to commit the same crime for the same motive against his 
younger step-daughter.  As Cone notes, even this simpler telling of the tale reveals 'a simple and 
satisfying structure' (1989, 87), and as such has a certain aesthetic appeal. 
The third reading of the story, and thus the reason why we might return not once but many 
times to it, is a more subtle affair.  The third reading, Cone proposes, is made in full awareness of 
the discoveries of both the first and second readings.  The naive enjoyment of the first reading is 
now replaced by 'intelligent and informed appreciation' (Cone 1989, 80).  Yet such appreciation 
presupposes a capacity to pretend to forget the outcome of the story.  That is to say, one appreciates 
Watson's narrative, not by seeing through it to the truth of the events that lie beneath, but rather one 
engages with its very ambiguity and confusion.  Cone gives other examples that throw light upon 
what he intends.  The third reading is the reading that an actor would give performing, or reading 
out loud, the story.  An actor, of course, knows the outcome of any story in which they play a 
character, but must perform in such a way that this foreknowledge is not revealed to the audience 
(Cone 1989, 84).  So, in one's third reading one acts out the story to oneself, suspending one's 
knowledge of the outcome of the tale.  Given that Cone's fundamental issue is the analysis of music, 
one of his most profound examples of a third reading comes from Beethoven.  An analysis (which is 
to say, a second reading) of the opening chord of the Ninth Symphony will reveal that it functions as 
the dominant of D minor.  Cone's point is that upon the listener's first experience of this chord it 
does not immediately sound like a dominant.  Its initial function within the music is highly 
ambiguous.  The naive listener is initially puzzled by this chord.  It only gradually comes to be 
perceived as a dominant, retrospectively and through a more analytic process of listening.  As Cone 
expresses this: 'it becomes the dominant' (1989, 86 [original italics]).  The third reader/listener must 
then not hear this chord as a dominant, precisely because the ambiguity is crucial to what 
Beethoven is trying to achieve.  One must, in effect, hear the chord's becoming, just as, when one 
re-reads Watson's account of the adventure of the speckled band, one experiences his gradually 
dawning awareness of what is really happening. 
In summary, Cone is arguing that our engagement with a work of art proceeds through three 
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stages: an initial pure or naive experience of the work; analysis; a final 'intelligent and informed 
appreciation' (Cone 1989, 80).  Cone suggests that these three stages may even be mapped on to the 
key male characters of 'The Speckled Band'.  Watson's experience is that of the naive listener, being 
surprised by the unfolding of events.  Roylott, in contrast, as the orchestrator of those events, shares 
the objective knowledge of the analyst.  Holmes, uncovering and coming to understand the true 
nature of the problem, is then the third reader, as once experiencing events unfold, and yet with an 
awareness of where they are leading (1989, 91).  As such, Cone offers an intriguing solution to the 
problem of why art works (let alone detective stories) should be worth revisiting.   
The nature of the crucial second stage may be noted.  Wittingly or unwittingly, Cone implies 
that an analysis of this structure can be definitive.  Approaching music from the largely formalist 
presuppositions of musical analysis, he suggests that the functions of notes, chords and thus 
passages of music can be determined with a significant degree of objectivity.  The aesthetic pleasure 
derived from the third reading of the work is thus rooted in the tension between the ambiguity of the 
first reading (and thus Watson's experience) and the objectivity of the second (and Roylott's 
machinations).   
The idea of an objective analysis of a work may be readily challenged.  Within the 
hermeneutic tradition, it may be suggested that definitive readings are anathema.  In this context, 
Cone may be understood to be offering a curtailed version of the hermeneutic circle.  The classic 
account of the hermeneutic circle holds that the reading of a text begins with certain expectations 
(or pre-judgements) as to the nature of the text and how it will proceed (see Gadamer 2004, 267ff).  
The reader thus has a preconception of the whole.  Cone recognises this in his appeal to the reader's 
expectations about how detective stories proceed (for example, that the most obvious suspect never 
commits the crime) and indeed how classical symphonies unfold (for example, that the first chord 
should be the tonic) (Cone 1989, 87).  The hermeneutician would argue that our experience of the 
work, and particularly of the details of that work, will either confirm or challenge these 
expectations.  Cone recognises this process to be at work within the ambiguities and confusions 
experienced within his first reading.  For the hermeneutician, the reader will respond to the 
problematic detail by rethinking their preconceptions of the whole.  Hence, again as Cone 
recognises, 'The Speckled Band' comes to be seen as an example, not of the 'whodunit', but of the 
'howdunit'.  Yet, for the hermeneutician, this second pre-conception of the whole is no more 
definitive than is the first (albeit that it may be richer and more encompassing).  It is at this point 
that hermeneutics departs from Cone.  The hermeneutic reader never proceeds with the security that 
Cone suggests.  The experience of ambiguity lies not in the tension between what is revealed in a 
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first and second reading, but rather in the continual turning of the hermeneutic circle.   
Cone's curtailment of the hermeneutic circle may be understood as a privileging of a special 
form of reading, which is to say, analysis.  Analysis arrests the movement of the hermeneutic circle.  
A disciplined and systematic description of the structure of the text interrupts the spontaneous flow 
of interpretation.  This analytic description is nonetheless intended to inform further interpretation, 
and thus to feed into the hermeneutic circle.  Cone notes that the third reading of a piece of music 
will be, typically, a performance (Cone 1989, 90), and yet a performance is necessarily an 
interpretation.  Beyond this, it may be suggested that analysis focuses upon a distinctive character 
of a text (and one that may be neglected by traditional hermeneutics).  Analysis is concerned with 
the structure of a text, and Cone may be taken to be arguing that it is therefore necessary, as a 
second reading, to texts where an awareness of structure is fundamental to their interpretation.  Put 
otherwise, music in particular requires the arresting of the hermeneutic circle precisely because 
musical meaning is predominantly syntactical rather than semantic.  This is to argue that the 
meaning of any element (such as a note, chord or sequence of notes) within the work must be 
understood through its relationship to other elements within the whole, rather than through any 
reference to a world beyond the music (or even to the evocation of an emotion).  A sequence of 
notes is meaningful simply because it reproduces or varies a sequence that has gone before.  
Equally, note and chord sequences will set up, fulfil or frustrate listeners' expectations of what 
should be happening.  Meaning thus lies in the role that a passage of music is playing in the creation 
and manipulation of expectation (see Meyer 1956).  Cone's initial example of the Sherlock Holmes 
story serves to indicate that awareness of structure is a necessary component of the interpretation of 
many (if not all) literary texts as well. 
Cone has highlighted a special form of reading (and it will be the contention below that this 
analytic reading is fundamental to our appreciation of sport).  Further, his account of three readings 
serves to identify something distinctive in the reading of an artistic text.  The hermeneutic circle is 
an account of the reading of any text..  Cone's account, in contrast, would not be relevant to, say, the 
interpretation of scientific texts.  But as such, Cone also hints at the source of aesthetic pleasure 
yielded by an artistic text.  Cone's account can be read as implicitly Kantian.  Kant, in his analysis 
of beauty, argues that our experience of beauty appeals to both the sensual faculty of the 
imagination, and the more rational faculty of understanding.  The art work is something that is 
sensually experienced and yet requires the engagement of the intellect or understanding.  The 
scientific text requires merely understanding, and as such yields no aesthetic pleasure.  The 
charming entertainment appeals only to the senses, and thus requires only imagination.  In Kant's 
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terms it yields a sensation of agreeableness [Angenehmen], not pleasure [Lust] (Kant 1952, §3).  
Thus, Cone is arguing that a genuine appreciation of music does not treat it merely as an agreeable 
or charming sequence of sounds, but rather that is is something that must, through analysis, be 
understood.  Only thus does music (or indeed any art work) yield pleasure. 
Despite their insights, Cone's arguments remain problematic.  This problem, and thus Cone's 
relationship to hermeneutics, may be understood, again, through appeal to Kant.  In the third 
moment of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' Kant argues that the observer is unable to identify the end 
or purpose of an object that is perceived to be beautiful (Kant 1952 §17).  Beauty is thus 
'purposiveness without purpose' (Adorno 1997, 184 [translation modified]).  That is to say that one 
recognises that the beautiful and thus aesthetically pleasurable object has been designed, and thus 
has a structure.  However, unlike our experience of a work of craft, one cannot identify the purpose 
or function to which this structure is to be put.  The object of beauty is thus ambiguous.  The 
beautiful object has no obvious extrinsic purpose, existing seemingly for its own sake alone. Further 
beauty itself cannot be pinned down or formulated, at least in terms of the set of rules or 
instructions for its making.  This stands in contrast to a work of craft.  The production of a work of 
craft follows pre-determined rules (Kant 1952, §43).  Kant may here be understood as anticipating 
the notion of Romantic irony whereby an art work offers itself to continual re-reading, precisely 
because it cannot be pinned down in one definitive interpretation (see Schlegel 1996).   
The hermeneutic circle may be understood as commenting upon the experience of 
'purposiveness without purpose'.  The work is ambiguous because it can be continually re-
interpreted.  In contrast, Cone, as noted above, places the experience of ambiguity between the 
naiveté of the first reading and the analysis of the second.  Cone aspires to definitiveness at the 
moment of analysis (see Edgar 1999, 440-1), so that analysis identifies, objectively, at least the 
function and purpose of each part within the whole, if not the rules that govern the whole.  This is 
problematic on two fronts.  Firstly, there is not one method of analysis in musicology, and different 
techniques, informed by different pre-judgements, will lead to different accounts of the structure of 
the work (see Cook 1987).  Secondly, and perhaps more significantly in terms of the hermeneutic 
circle, while analysis may inform performance, it does not obviously determine it.  The 
performance becomes a test of the analysis, not a mere application.  It is only in performance (or the 
third reading) that one discovers whether or not analysis has generated a coherent, aesthetically 
satisfying experience of the work.  The contention of the hermeneutician will be that no 
performance or third reading of any work of sufficient depth and subtlety will be wholly satisfying.  
The sense of ambiguity will not then be, as Cone maintains, an experience designed and 
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manipulated by the artist, in their skilful management of the work's deep and surface structures, but 
rather a real resistance to interpretation.  The experience of the work will be ambiguous because 
parts stubbornly refuse to fit into any pre-conception of the whole. 
In summary of this section, I have argued that Cone offers a significant account of the process 
of interpretation of certain art works.  This account has some points of contact with hermeneutic 
arguments, but its focus on the structure or syntax of the work highlights a special form of reading: 
analysis.  In this Cone offers, perhaps unintentionally, an account of the pleasure that the audience 
derives from an art work, precisely as a Kantian harmony of the faculties of the imagination and the 
understanding.  Cone's account becomes problematic precisely where he suggests that analysis can 
be definitive, and as such determine the third reading, rather than allowing itself to be tested and 
proved in that reading.  It will be argued in the next section that sport, as a rule governed activity, 
offers itself to analysis.  As such, the appreciation of a sports match may rest upon something akin 
to Cone's three readings. 
 
Re-reading a sports match 
A sports match may be revisited through various media.  The story of a game may simply be retold.  
The angler may tell the tale of the one that got away.  A newspaper will provide a more formal 
report.  Matches may be chronicled in publications such as Wisden Cricketers' Almanack.  Games 
of chess can be recorded exactly, through notational systems that precisely describe each move.  
Modern film and video technology allows sports matches to be recorded in some detail and from 
multiple angles and perspectives.  Sport is, thus, not quite as ephemeral as it may first seem.  A 
game is not forgotten the moment it is played.  It lingers, for a lesser or greater time, in the memory 
of the individual and the community.  Sports matches are thus revisited. 
It was noted above that Cone accepts that a detective story may be re-read, 'not for story but 
for style, for portrayal of character, for comment on society' (1989, 77-8).  So, sport is similarly 
revisited for diverse reasons.  An exciting, beautiful or innovative move may be celebrated for its 
style.  Thus, Reifenstahl's film documenting the 1936 Olympics, Olympia, records the graceful 
movement of divers, athletes and gymnasts.  Character is portrayed in a sports biography, be this in 
the more traditional form of a written narrative or as a  montage of video recordings.  Games played 
will inevitably be a focus of an such story.  Similarly, a certain pleasure can be gained in following 
the career of a first class cricketer by tracing the records and reports of their matches in a sequence 
of Wisdens.  As comment on society, a sports match may be treated simply as a historical or 
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sociological document.  Again, Reifenstahl's Olympia is of interest because of the light that it sheds 
upon the use of sport in Nazi propaganda.  More innocently, it also shows much about the attitudes 
and techniques of athletes in the 1930s (such as marathon runners stopping to drink and eat, or pole 
vaulters dropping into a sand pit).   
While all of these reasons may be important, they each reflect the tension that Cone implies 
between returning to a story as a story and returning to it for other reasons.  Cone, in the second 
reading in particular, is concerned with the story (or piece of music) as whole, as opposed to 
'savoring appropriate passages here and there' (1989, 78).  To appreciate a sports movement for its 
style detaches it from the flow of the game as a whole, and from any concern with the result.  
(There is a contrast between the first and seconds parts of Olympia, precisely in that the first part 
places more emphasis upon the development of the competition as a whole, for example in sprinting 
and pole-vault, while the second part focuses on the movement of athletes separate from the 
competition.)  Similarly, documentary concern with sport may not be an interest in sport as sport, 
much as a reading of Homer for what it can tell the historian about the techniques of ancient Greece 
sea-going neglects the story and thus the art.  In Olympia sport is, in part, of interest as propaganda. 
The case of 'portrayal of character' is more complex.  Cone's own argument largely neglects 
this aspect of the art work, as his formalist approach displaces more expressivist considerations of 
art (where the quality of the art work would be judged primarily, not in terms of the subtlety and 
innovation of its structure, as Cone argues, but rather it terms of its capacity to express human 
emotion and character).  This problem will be returned to below, but an initial comment may be 
made in order to orient and frame the following discussion.  A film such as When we were Kings, 
documenting the 1974 world heavyweight boxing match between George Foreman and Muhammad 
Ali (and indeed documenting it as a whole), provides an important account of both the contest and 
its relationship to its historical period.  Yet it may also be re-watched precisely for its portrayal of 
the characters of all involved.  Such an example raises the question as to whether it matters that it is 
a sports film.  Any documentary film, just like any historical narrative, could and frequently will 
seek to portray the characters involved.  In effect, character is betrayed by the actions that are 
recorded in the narrative.  A good detective story, like any expressivist art work, will, in subtle 
contrast, develop the character of its heroes (and villi ans) through their involvement in the plot.  
The plot is not simply a sequence of events that betrays the character of the protagonists.  It is rather 
constructed deliberately to reveal that character.   
This is, in effect, to argue that the very concept of 'portrayal' is ambiguous.  It raises the 
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possibility that an art work does not merely represent a character, but provides a context within 
which the audience may consciously reflect upon aspects of character.  So too, it will be argued, a 
good sports match allows the characters of the players, as players, to be made available for 
reflection.  The ludic challenges of the game test certain physical and psychological qualities of the 
players, and as such reveal specific characters or personae.  Before developing this argument, and as 
such a crucial argument as to why a sports match may be re-watched, the relevance of Cone's 
formalist second reading to sport will be reviewed, for it highlights precisely the problem of 
experiencing sport as sport and experiencing the sports match as a whole.  The structure revealed in 
the second reading is the context within which the portrayal of character, in any profound sense, can 
be experienced. 
It has been argued above that Cone's second reading is a special form of interpretation.  The 
usual temporally unfolding narrative that concerns hermeneutics is replaced by an atemporal, or 
spatial, laying out of the structure or form of the work, possibly in diagrams (Cone 1989, 85).  My 
contention here is that this second reading is a constitutive moment of sport as a hermeneutic event.  
This is to make two claims.  Firstly, that sport, like any human interaction, is constituted through 
the interpretative skills of its participants.  Secondly, that a special form of interpretative skill, that 
of analysis, is required to understand a sports match in any depth or profundity.  These claims may 
be articulated by returning to Cone's analogy of Watson, Roylott and Holmes as, respectively first, 
second and third readers of a text.   
Watson, Roylott and Holmes may be considered as participants in a game, albeit that this 
leads to an importantly different account of their relationship to reading and interpretation than 
Cone's.  Watson is the spectator, watching the unfolding events.  Roylott and Holmes are players.  
They contend against each other.  Roylott, the attacker, has the objective of disposing of Helen 
Stoner.  Holmes, the defender, has the task of stopping him.  The strangeness of a detective story is 
that the reader does not know – at least until the denouement of the tale – against whom the 
detective competes.  Yet there is still a contest here (albeit one where the reader knows that the 
detective will win).  Perhaps more importantly, the characters within the tale could offer their own 
stories.  Holmes, indeed, has the opportunity to recount his version of the events as he explains 
everything to Watson.  Roylott, had he survived, would no doubt have been able to offer his own 
distinctive narrative, defiantly cursing Holmes' meddling and his own ill-luck  As readers, we might 
also imagine that, as the events unfold, the characters are gradually constructing and modifying 
their own narratives of  what is happening.  Crucially, such narratives will also shape their 
subsequent actions.  In any social interaction, the actors can only know what to do next – how to 
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carry on – if they can offer an interpretation of what has already happened.   
The characters' narratives thus serve to shape the development of the story as a whole.  To 
consider Roylott and Holmes as contestants is to recognise the part that narrative will play in the 
construction and pursuit of any game.  The sports match (like, indeed, any meaningful social 
interaction) is a hermeneutic event.  It is constituted and unfolds through the interpretations and 
narratives of its participants and the implications that those narratives have for going on 
meaningfully.  In effect, each player works relentlessly through the hermeneutic circle, the narrative 
of the whole being continually tested and revised in the light of the subsequent particular actions 
that arises from it. 
How a player acts, or how they go on, will depend upon how well they make sense of their 
own and others' actions.  Yet a sports match is distinctive, as a hermeneutic event, because the 
meaning of one's own and others' actions will be mediated by one's interpretation of the constitutive 
rules of the sport (to which all players are self-consciously abiding).  An action will only make 
sense if it is encapsulated by those rules (even if it has meaning only as a 'foul' or other illegal play).  
Further, the rules constitute ludic goals for the players, be these the goal of winning (e.g. 
completing 18 holes in fewer strokes than one's opponent), or intermediate goals (such as tackling 
an offender fairly and effectively; playing an un-returnable tennis shot; negotiating a bunker).  
Further, players do not merely give meaning to their actions in terms of the rules of the game, but 
will also judge how well they are playing: where they have been successful and where they have 
failed in pursuit of those ludic goals.  The player's self-narrative will be, very significantly, 
entwined with the narrative they tell about their opponents, and again what their opponents' actions 
mean, and how well they are playing.  Judgements of intention, motivation, physical, or even 
psychological, strength and frailty are all part of this narrative.  This complex narrative, giving 
sense to one's own and others' actions, allows the player to go on, continuing to act meaningfully 
and purposefully.  Thus, to return to the analogy of Holmes and Roylott as players, after his visit to 
Holmes, in the midst of the game as it were, Roylott may assume that he has successfully warned 
off Holmes.  He is thus free to launch his final, deadly, assault on Miss Stoner.  Holmes will have a 
story of Roylott's complacency and arrogance, and so can plan how to outwit him.   
If Holmes and Roylott are players, the position of Watson is a little more ambiguous.  The 
Watson who we encounter as a character within the story is a spectator.  He stands slightly on the 
sidelines, struggling to make sense of the sequence of events that he experiences.  Again, there is a 
hermeneutic circle in play, but here the narrative of the whole is tested, not by Watson's actions, but 
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by the subsequent events that he witnesses.  But Watson is not an entirely naive spectator.  He is 
familiar with Holmes' methods.  He has an idea, however vague, of how Holmes is responding to 
the challenge that Roylott poses.  In an analogy to sport, Watson is the spectator who is familiar 
with the nature of the game.  He may not know what will happen next, but he understands the rules, 
and appreciates a bold and unexpected play when he sees one.  He may even be seen as the radio or 
television commentator, offering an informed, unfolding, narrative.  Yet Watson is not just a 
character within the story.  He is also the narrator of the story.  In Cone's terms, he (rather than 
Holmes) is the third reader, who knows how things will turn out, but in order to tell the story well, 
to sustain the tension of suspense and ambiguity, pretends ignorance.  This is the spectator retelling, 
skilfully, the story of a game to a friend, but not revealing the final score until the narrative ends.  
This is perhaps the least useful analogy to the drawn, but it does draw upon the fact that games are 
hermeneutic events not merely in their creation, but also in the retrospective stories that spectators 
will tell.  The game continues being interpreted and re-interpreted in players' tales of glorify or 
anguish, in newspaper reports, and even in archives such as Wisden.   
There is a further subtlety in Holmes' narrative and his place as a character.  As noted above, 
Watson records Holmes' final account and explanation of the events.  Through this Watson can 
understand the events properly, and so construct the third reading.  Here Holmes moves from a 
mere player to an analyst (and, contra Cone, it is Holmes who personifies the second reader, and not 
Roylott).  Holmes' account of the contest is that of a coach (or perhaps, draining the last drops from 
the analogy, a player-manager).  Holmes understands the winning strategy.  His account of the 
game is thus of a different order to that of even the moderately well informed spectator.  It is, as 
Cone suggests of a second reading, diagrammatic.  The analysis of the game abandons the linear or 
temporal narrative in favour of a time that can be stalled, in order to identify and evaluate the 
positions of each player at a given moment, or even reversed, in order to analyse the build-up of a 
move, and to identify alternative positions that players could have occupied.  Such an analysis may 
appear to be concerned with only details of the game, and thus with important passages of play, 
rather than with the game as a whole.  However, a thorough analysis will take in the game as a 
whole.  A successful passage of play may realise perfectly a strategy that has only been partially 
realised earlier in the game; conversely it may rest upon a change of strategy, unexpected by the 
opposition players.  Each moment thus has its full analysis only in the context of the whole, and it is 
this analysis that informs and enriches a third reading. 
It was noted above, with respect to Cone, that in characterising the second reading as he does, 
as an analysis that arrests the hermeneutic circle, that he privileges a certain type of art work.  
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Music, and in particular the Western canon of high art music with which Cone is concerned, lends 
itself to such formal analysis, and does so because music may be understood primarily as of 
syntactical, rather than semantic meaning.  Sport is similar (see Edgar 2013, 140-167).  The 
meaning of any movement within the game is determined, not by its reference to anything beyond 
the game, but by its relationship to the constitutive rules of the sport and to other moves already 
made or anticipated.  The analysis of strategy thus explicates these syntactical relationships.  While 
the coach and the analyst at the end of the game may have the most complete (although never 
necessarily definitive) understanding of strategy, a partial grasp of strategy must be part of the 
competent player's on-going interpretation of the game.  The player knows their own teams' strategy 
and will be trying to work out the strategy of their opponents.  Players' second readings are thus part 
of the intersubjective construction of the game as a meaningful social process.  The greater the 
tactical acumen of the player, the more readily, it may be suggested, are they able to integrate 
revisions to the second reading within the continuing movement of the hermeneutic circle, 
reinterpreting the events around them. 
The relationship between the relatively naive spectator and that of the analyst (and thus 
between Watson as character and Holmes as player-manager) may be illustrated by recounting a 
personal experience of watching a game.  The game in question was the second game of the 
National Basketball Association finals, between Miami Heat and San Antonio Spurs, in 2013.  I am 
a relatively naive spectator of basketball, understanding the basic rules, but few subtleties of the 
game.  This particular contest was puzzling.  The game was evenly balanced until the third quarter.  
Miami then began to outscore San Antonio significantly.  I could follow the crude meaning of the 
game, in that I could obviously enough recognise a basket when scored.  But I had no idea why 
Miami were suddenly outplaying San Antonio.  I could not tell whether their offensive tactics had 
changed, identifying and responding to a weakness in the San Antonio defence, or whether the San 
Antonio defence was now simply making errors, or perhaps missing a key player.  I could, thus, 
profitably re-watch the game under the guidance of a suitably knowledgeable analyst.  Here, in 
effect, is Cone's point.  I would not simply watch the game with the analyst (which is to say, follow 
an analysis of tactics that would of necessity break from the temporal flow of the game).  Having 
understood the analysis, I could watch the game for a third time and, although fully aware of the 
final result, would appreciate the flow of play as a realisation of that result. 
At its most basic, this is the claim that an analytic knowledge is fundamental to the 
appreciation of strategic sports.  It is the claim that, without the capacity for this analytic second 
reading the sports match can only be agreeable entertainment (in Kant's sense of agreeableness), 
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and not a genuine pleasure.  Thus I readily found the Miami/San Antonio game entertaining.  There 
was something exhilarating in watching Miami's developing dominance.  But without a deeper 
understanding of basketball strategy it is no more than exhilarating (and akin to a listener who 
merely follows the pleasant, exciting or moving sounds of the music, without concentrating 
sufficiently to understanding the unfolding musical argument).  Something similar may be seen in 
American Football.  A short highlights package may focus on the exciting moments when 
touchdowns are scored.  Typically this entails showing a single down.  While there will indeed be 
strategic and tactical issues that can be contemplated here, the emphasis is still primarily on the 
exhilaration of, say, a successful forward pass.  To see the sequence of downs that led to the touch 
down, and thus the offensive team's struggle to move up the pitch, adds further context, and much 
richer strategy considerations.  The touchdown is not then a moment that is exciting in itself, but 
rather the culmination of a pleasurable, analysed, whole. 
Beyond this basic, albeit important, point, it may be argued that analysis allows the 
interpretation of the game to go beyond the syntactical.  Put boldly, analysis allows one to 
appreciate a game as an expression of the human condition.  In 1996, Bjarne Riis won the Tour de 
France.  Stage 16, a mountain stage, was particularly important to this win.  Riis was already 
leading the Tour.  In addition, he took part in a break-away group at the head of the day's race.  He 
attacked this group a number of times, trying to gain an individual lead.  A crucial moment then 
occurred.  Riis seemed to drop to the back off the group.  Here was the ambiguity that both Cone 
and hermeneutics highlight.  The move initially made no clear sense.  Perhaps Riis was exhausted, 
and this was the end of his challenge, possibly his Tour as a whole.  However, Riis then began to 
cycle back, passing the group.  He looked at each rider in turn.  Once at the head of the group, he 
kept up his pace, easily cycling away to victory (of the stage, and thus of the Tour).   
A re-watching of this moment is telling.  Understanding it requires analysis, for the deeper 
one's awareness of technicalities such as gearing, as well as tactics within a break-away (for 
example, of how riders co-operate, work with or without team mates, and challenge each other).  
Riis can be seen doing, perhaps, two things.  Technically, he is looking at the gears that his 
competitors are using, and so assessing their degree of exhaustion.  Psychologically, he may be 
psyching out these competitors.  The ride up, passing them, announces, 'Look what I can do!'.  A 
third watching of this event will enjoy the ambiguity between deep and surface structures that Cone 
identifies.  The surface experience is ambiguous, and in a third watching, one may identify, not just 
with Riis, who after all knows what is going on, but with his competitors.  A fleeting moment of 
hope ('Riis is exhausted') becomes despair ('I am exhausted').  Here is the point of much ambiguity 
15 
in tactical sport.  The behaviour of one's opponent is frequently ambiguous or even baffling, even if 
one is striving to interpret it within the frame of the constitutive rules of the sport.  One tries to 
confuse and deceive one's opponents (through, for example, feints, dummy passes, and the like).  
Only in a second reading can the true meaning of the move be understood (by spectator and player 
alike).  It is only in a third reading, stepping outside the immediacy of the game, that this tension 
between naive experience and tactics can be appreciated and enjoyed (as Kant's semi-intellectual 
pleasure). 
The Riis example may be taken further.  The rules of road cycling constitute a series of ludic 
challenges.  They put specific tests to the physical body, but also the psychology, of the athlete.  It 
is here that the character of the athlete, as athlete, is revealed for reflection.  Riis' ride may thus be 
understood, not simply as a physical struggle, but also as a social and psychological one.  Road 
cycling is a team event and yet it is the individual winner who matters.  One or two individuals are 
supported and privileged by their teams.  As such, certain forms of social or communal organisation 
are thematised by the sport's rule.  The sport thus reveals something complex about the human 
condition, and the human capacity to deal with physical stress (demanding extremes of strength and 
endurance), as well subtle forms of co-operation and competition.  The interpretation of Riis' 
victory is thus not simply formal.  While analysis focuses upon the syntax of constitutive rules and 
tactics, a full understanding recognised the substance of the competition in the experience of the 
athletes. 
A final example may illustrate this.  As noted above, Leon Gast's 1996 film When we were 
Kings records the 1974 heavyweight championship contest between Ali and Foreman (the 'Rumble 
in the Jungle').  The film can certainly be re-watched, although that in itself does not entail that the 
boxing match itself is worth re-watching.  One may watch the film as a film, appreciating its 
artistry, rather than the fight it documents.  But the contest itself is extraordinary.  Between the 
second and seventh rounds, after a relatively aggressive first round, Ali allowed Foreman to punch 
him, with the most minimal attempt to fight back.  Here again, from the perspective of a first reader, 
is baffling or ambiguous behaviour.  Ali's strategy, if that is what it is, is radically unclear.  The 
mystery is resolved in the eighth round.  Foreman's offence is more tiring than Ali's defence, if Ali 
can absorb the (considerable) punishment.  A relatively fresh Ali could then knock out the 
exhausted Foreman in the eighth round.   
A second reading can analyse Ali's tactic, and indeed recognise it as such, against the back 
ground of a understanding of more orthodox boxing tactics.  A second reading can also analysis 
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Foreman's tactics, and how he is trying to make sense of, and thus cope with, what Ali is doing.  A 
third reading again strives to watch the match, appreciating the ambiguity as a tension between 
surface and deep structures, or between Ali's overt behaviour and deep tactic.  But it is also here 
that a re-watching goes beyond a mere appreciation of boxing tactics, and thus beyond the merely 
syntactical.  The physical punishment that Ali endures, and indeed the humiliation experienced by 
an outwitted and out-boxed Foreman, turns the contest into an exploration of the human condition.  
The bout itself, and not just the film, rewards re-watching, and in this goes beyond Cone's focus on 
the ambiguity that lies in the tension between first and second readings, to a hermeneutic circle, and 
so beyond a mere matter of strategy and tactics, or the interpretation of the rules of the sport.  The 
bout invites interpretation and re-interpretation as to exactly what it does say about the human 
condition.  It is an infinitely rich hermeneutic event, a study in suffering, endurance and self-
discipline.  
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that a sports match may reward being watched multiple times.  Sport is a specific 
form of hermeneutic event.  It is constituted through the interpretations of its participants, and the 
implications that these interpretations have for how play continues.  More specifically, 
interpretations are structured by the constitutive rules of the sport, so that both the interpretation of 
one's own and others' actions are mediated by knowledge of what is meaningful action in terms of 
the rules, but also that one's development and presentation of oneself as a player depends upon the 
possibilities, in terms of the ludic goals of the games, that the rules constitute.  Much of the 
behaviour of players in any strategic contest will be ambiguous as to its meaning and purpose, not 
least as players seek to deceive and outwit each other.  It is this initial ambiguity that Cone 
highlights as characteristic of the first reading of a detective story (and indeed first hearing of 
music, or at least music of any subtlety).  Precisely because a sports match is constituted by 
syntactical rules, understanding of this naive experience will require analysis.  Analysis, it has been 
argued, partially arrests the hermeneutic circle.  It is a special form of interpretation, abandoning the  
temporal flow of narrative in favour of a atemporal or spatial exploration of events and their 
relationships.  Analysis identifies the tactics that underpin and make sense of that which is 
experienced in a first reading.  A good strategic player will incorporate this analytic awareness in 
their on-going interpretation of the unfolding of the game.  The pleasure of a third reading comes, 
however, from watching the game as a whole, with awareness of the tactical choices being made 
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through out, and thus in awareness of the tension between the ambiguities of a first reading and the 
relative analytic certainty of a second reading.  As a game unfolds, the third reading will reveal how 
particular move come to have a certain meaning and significance.  Riis' possible exhaustion 
becomes his moment of triumph.   
It was argued that Cone's account of three readings is flawed, both in terms of the 
definitiveness or objectivity that he appears to attribute to a second reading, but also because of his 
formalism.  There seems little scope to move from a formalist second reading to substantial issues, 
such as the portrayal, or more precisely expression, of human character.  Sport, at its most 
profound, bridges the gulf between the formal and the substantial.  The rules of sport constitute 
specific physical and psychological tests for competitors.  It is thus in response to these tests that 
athletes come to explore the human condition, testing the limits of physical and psychological 
strengths, and exposing weaknesses.  In great contests, the sports match aspires to the status of a 
essay on the human condition, in all its comic and tragic diversity, as athletes engage with their own 
frailty and contingency, thrown into a sporting arena that is at once tightly regulated, and yet 
typically open to the vicissitudes of good and ill luck.  Sport may not be art, but at its best, it may 
yield an aesthetic pleasure similar to that which the arts themselves yield. 
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